

his view that we find particularly in the Mimamsa and the Nyaya schools.

01:00.07

It's really interesting that every classical Indian philosopher - my sense is, at least, that this is true - after Dharmakirti, either read Dharmakirti or at least knew of his work and it was so important that for a thousand years his opponents were occupied with trying to refute his views.

01:00.29

And, so the reason I've been included in on this is not for any philosophic talent, but rather just to give you a sense of history. Now, if I may indulge- If I may beg the indulgence of the chair, I'd like to read my paper. My response.

01:00.49

I'm not so skilled in contemporaneous presentation. I think we might get more information from me if I read it. I have a few copies here, if some of you would like-

01:01.02

TAPE END

MIND & REALITY

DAY ONE - TAPE 4 of 8 - PANEL ON KNOWLEDGE

TAPE START

STEPHEN PHILLIPS

00:00.00 Professors Block and Carey have done a wonderful job at showing how Dharmakirti can stimulate contemporary philosophers and engage them in coming to some very difficult problems and theories.

00:00.27 What I'm gonna try to do is give you a sense of Dharmakirti's philosophy in the context of classical Indian thought and the opposition to his view that we find, particularly in the Mimamsa and the Nyaya schools. It's really interesting that every classical Indian philosopher - my sense is, at least, that this is true - after Dharmakirti either read Dharmakirti or at least knew of his work.

00:01.03

And it was so important that it- for a thousand years his opponents were occupied with trying to refute his views. And so my- the reason I've been included on this is not for any philosophic talent, but rather just to give you a sense of the history.

00:01.22

Now, if I may indulge- If I may beg the indulgence of the chair, I'd like to read my paper and my response. I'm not so skilled in contemporaneous presentation. I think we might get more information from me if I read it. I have copies here if some of you would like to follow along.

00:01.51

Ok. As I said, almost every point of Dharmakirti's philosophy was disputed by metaphysical realists of the, particularly of the Mimamsa and Nyaya schools. And first of all, intentionality - this is on page two - vivaksa (ph) - which is the technical term used by

Mimamsic and Naiy_yikas, which we might render as having object-directedness.

00:02.17

Is a relation linking cognition to things external to cognition? This is a primary topic in late classical Indian philosophy and there are many Nyaya works that have it in their title. Two, cognition according to Nyaya is irreflexive except in special circumstances such as every cognition is knowable, a cognition that is itself knowable.

00:02.43

Requiring apperception to be grasped as is evidenced by our awareness, by our sometimes being totally absorbed in objects having no awareness of our own consciousness. Three - processes of knowledge generation, pr_mana, perception, et cetera, are not the same critters as the cognitions that are their results - pram_. Namely, bits of knowledge, which as cognitions with vishyata (ph) are world directed.

- 00:03.10 Four - not being deceptive is an inadequate characterization of knowledge as is shown by a mistaken inference to fire where there is actually fire, from misperceiving a line of dust as smoke. The resulting cognition while true and non-deceptive does not have the right pedigree.
- 00:03.30 Five - the issue of cognition as sakata (ph) or as the realists hold along with the Buddhist Madhyamaka school, nerakata (ph), with or without form of its own or aspect is tied to that of vishyata (ph), according to Naiy_yikas.
- 00:03.46 Six - Nyaya philosophers concur with Dharmakirti that cognition is not self-validating, arguing against Advaita Vedantans, for instance, that even if it were self-reflexive, it need not be self-validating as is shown by cases of doubt about say, a river seen in the distance for the very first time with the perception only later known as veridical.

00:04.07 That is only when we have confirmed that the cognized thing is a river by walking up closer and quenching our thirst. Seven – the distinction between perception and inferential knowledge, et cetera is not to be drawn along the lines of the one having and the other not having content, object-directedness, vishyata (ph).

00:04.27 Since for one thing, perception is commonly recognitive, suvykulpika (ph), the terminant, to use the Buddhist term. This is that pot I saw previously. Here a memory feeds a presentation of the senses. More on this in a moment. Eight – the primary meaning of linguistic science is referential. The apoha (ph) theory is motivated by nominalism, which is unfounded.

00:04.50 There are at least five further lines of argument in favor of universals as ontologically uneliminable. Nine – what appears to be a source of Buddhist error is a misunderstanding of causal relationship and the bundle or samagri (ph)

concept. Such a bundle is causally efficient, having a trigger as only one of numerous cooperating factors arriving more or less late on the scene -

00:05.14

some of which are rightly called causes in the distinct sense of a necessary, but not by itself sufficient, condition. The Buddhist proofs of momentariness fatally depend on a view of a single factor as a lone causally efficient. More about this, too. I think momentariness is the key Buddhist doctrine, at least in the classical context.

00:05.36

Ten - finally, the fact that I can remember and recognize only what I myself have experienced. This is that Bob Thurman I saw previously. Proves an enduring self. Let me slow down now to look more closely at the issue of self as locus of mental disposition, samskara.

00:05.58

I think that samskara is one of the most interesting concepts for contemporary philosophy of mind. These are the properties that account for potential memories and non-occurrent beliefs. Many contemporary philosophers of mind have a dispositional analysis of non-occurrent belief.

00:06.16

Here, the major disagreement in the classical context concerns Buddhist momentariness and the denial of endurance, especially of anything so soteriologically suspect as Nyaya's enduring self. However, my main point in dwelling on this is to bring out that in the midst of disagreement, there are broad affinities of Buddhist ideas with Nyaya and other Hindu quote unquote schools, concerning yogic and meditational opportunities, in particular.

00:06.46

In widest perspective, the Buddhist attacks on an enduring self, recorded in the sermons of the Pali canon seem to connect with spiritual exercises intended to correct false

identification with the body and mind. The idea of no self was probably meant to guide practice. As in Sankhya and Yoga philosophies and much Vedanta, also, this identification with dharma we commonly take to be ourselves - the body, thought, desires, emotions, all the phenomena in the skanda (ph), the five bands or streams - was viewed as essential to spiritual progress.

00:07.22

The medicine view of Nagarjuna, according to which doctrine is discarded when cured, is clearly in line with this. Furthermore, similarly to what is preached by Vedanta, that which is discovered in the supreme enlightenment is not a theory, but rather an extinguishing of a putative consciousness where supernal bliss, nivriti (ph), emerges.

00:07.43

One early Buddhist position that nicely makes the contrast is Sarv_stiv_da, which has the person as a composite of 75 dharmas, among which nirvana is one. This dharma is distinguished by being

eternal, as opposed to the fleetingness of thoughts, et cetera. Sarv_stiv_da did not remain mainstream, but it shows Buddhist philosophy's commitment to the value of enlightenment.

00:08.05

The common theme is that by appreciating the fleetingness of life, one is led to detachment and advancement on the path. Now, in the renewal of metaphysical reasoning that Vasubhandu represents, in contrast to the conservative anti-intellectualism of Nagarjuna, it is important, I think, to see momentariness - ksanavata (ph) - as the central doctrine - not no self, or an-atman (ph). For all things including what we take to be an enduring self or person, but not restricted to that, all things are in reality, momentary.

00:08.38

Dharmakirti puts forth the standard momentariness proofs in a consonant stream theory of the person. Objects of everyday discourse, viyavahada (ph), are temporal and spatial heaps of sualuctunas (ph) - things that are their own

marks(?). That is to say, ultimate particulars that exist for a moment, exercising causal efficiency and self-destructing.

00:09.01

The Buddhist view is often called by its- and sometimes by itself ksana-bhanga-vada (ph) - the theory of instantaneous destruction. So, two is the self or person - a composite of momentary self-destructing particulars. The intelligibility of the Buddhist theory is challenged by the question of what secures membership in the same series.

00:09.24

Against the Nyaya counterpart - enduring self view - there are a set of Buddhist arguments against the possibility of unrealized capacities. Causal sufficiency is said to secure series membership. Only the seed in the ground gives rise to the sprout. The immediate predecessor is causally sufficient and thus counts as belonging to a seed-sprout series stretching back through a line of seed moments in the granary.

00:09.48

Each, causally sufficient for a single successor in a seed stream. Naiy_yikas hold, in contrast, that the seed is only part of the causal story. A seed being a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a sprout. Other necessary conditions are water, soil, heat and so on, which coming together in an appropriate bundle - samagri - together produce the sprout.

00:10.12

Buddhists such as Dharmakirti deny that a mere necessary condition is properly a cause. Dharmakirti and other Buddhists endorse the following inference - that which exists is momentary, like a cloud. Yutsut kutshanikam (ph) [Phrase continues]...

00:10.30

Since with respect to Naiy_yikas and other non-Buddhists mutually acceptable examples of co-location of the prover existent and the prabhanda (ph) momentariness - a flame, but also a stone; a

thought, but also a lake; a river, but also the sky - are hard to come by.

00:10.47

The inference is supplemented by various reductio attacks on the assumption that anything that endures could be a cause. So, we have anything x that actually causes y in the next instant is distinct from something w that does not cause y right away. No two things are identical if they fail to have all the same properties.

00:11.08

The property of producing an effect is especially important since it marks off the real from the imaginary. Arthakriyakaritva, causal efficacy - the Buddhist definition of what it is to exist. A seed sprouts at a certain moment, giving rise to a sprout. If it had endured with its property of not being sprout-producing, it would not have produced the sprout.

00:11.32

The seed that sprouts is distinct from all its causal predecessors in the granary. This is so in

virtue of the one having sprout causal power and the others, not. Only the seed in the ground, watered and warm, is sprout productive. Now, Dharmakirti and company are quite explicit about the everyday person being a causally ordered continuum - santana (ph) - causal series.

00:11.57

This is a stream united over two moments by memory impression, samskara, informing present consciousness. But how is this possible, given momentariness? The Buddhist answer seems to be that though different from what he was yesterday, Davidata (ph) can be recognized by us, who are different from what we were because our sight of him is impregnated, sagarbhita (ph), by a rich samskara series shaping our current perception.

00:12.24

The immediately preceding moment of ourselves is fecund. Sufficient to produce the current moment of ourselves. The Naiy_yika response voiced by Udayana - or best voiced by Udayana circa 1000 -

is that memory and recognition show the inadequacy of the Buddhist reductionism.

00:12.43

If, as the Buddhist proposes, self and personal identity reduce to a series of psychological events held together causally, the temporal gap between the original experience and the later remembering cannot be explained. What happens to the information during the period when there is no awareness of it? The samskara, as beneath the threshold of consciousness is unavailable to Buddhist presentism, according to which every moment of awareness is self-aware, self-intimating, self-reflexive.

00:13.13

Similarly, the Buddhist is forced to view deep sleep not as an absence of consciousness, but rather as a period when the consciousness stream is composed of moments of self-consciousness without object-consciousness. It the lack of object-consciousness that is supposed to account for our inability to remember.

00:13.30

But Udayana brings out that all remembering presupposes a psychological gap – a period when the information gathered by the original experience is absent from consciousness. In the Nyaya view it lies latent in the self as the content of a mental disposition – samskara.

00:13.47

Desiring to possess or avoid something of a type remembered would be impossible in the Buddhist theory, the realists claim. Two, as well as recognition, which permeates our mental life. Also impossible would be comprehension of a sentence, which though its words are uttered sequentially, is a single thought. But note then in broader perspective, both theories find continuities beyond the body and anything material.

00:14.13

Buddhists share with Hindus beliefs about karma and reincarnation and the centrality of virtuous action. Even without admitting itself as locus of

mental dispositions, Buddhists view causal connections as running past death. Causal sequences are not embedded exclusively in the physical body.

00:14.32

The primary support for this view is taken by the classical philosophers of a yogic perception - yoga-pratyaksa (ph) - which is admitted by Buddhists and Hindus alike, though there are other arguments. And I think that both Bob Thurman and Mark Siderits are gonna talk about this. I think this really is the, if not the key, one of the most important issues for us.

00:14.56

Recall Dreyfus's appeal in his paper. He makes this appeal to: "meditative evidence in support of the Buddhist position on the nature of the distinction between, as it were, concept-free perception and concept-laden inference. There are, of course, disagreements about what Yogic perception shows. But almost everyone sees it as comprising a kind of direct acquaintance with

samskara, some of which are known not to have been formed in the current lifetime.

00:15.23

Indeed, the Yoga Sutra distinguishes samskara which are new to a given birth and those called vasana (ph), which range over multiple births. I believe just about all Buddhist philosophers accept a similar conception. Thank you.

APPLAUSE

GARY TUBB

00:15.45

Thank you very much. Yes. I think before we turn to taking questions from the audience, we have a few things to discuss at the table. And to begin with, since Professor Dreyfus was brave enough to present himself as a target, I'd like to give him an opportunity to respond to some of the comments that we've heard from the others.

GEORGES DREYFUS